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I. INTRODUCTION
No power of the federal government in the United States today
entails more elaborate impacts on society than the power of Congress
to spend; yet none has received so little critical analysis from legal
scholars.
On those few occasions when commentators have troubled even
to discuss the constitutional basis for federal spending (as distinguished
from its many ramifications), without modern exception they have
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pointed to a subordinate phrase in the opening clause of the Constitu-
tion's Article I, Section 8. That clause gives Congress "Power To lay
and collect Taxes," and the subordinate phrase explains that such taxes
are "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States."1
This Article undertakes to demonstrate, however, that Congress'
power to spend does not derive from that so-called "General Welfare"
Clause, but instead derives from two overlapping but independent
provisions found elsewhere in the Constitution. First, spending "for
carrying into Execution" any enumerated power is authorized by the
familiar Necessary and Proper Clause.2 Second, Article IV gives
Congress "Power to dispose of ... Property belonging to the United
States," one species of such property being money in the Treasury.'
This "Property Clause" is ample to authorize all federal spending,4
whether or not it is also authorized by the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
II. THE BEARING OF BASIS
A. Some Consequences of Misattribution
Whether the spending power derives from one clause or another
is not an idle or merely academic question. There are consequences of
major importance. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
one's taxpayer status can give standing to challenge only such federal
acts as assert "authority conferred by the taxing and spending clause
of Article I, Sec. 8"; specifically, the Court has held that taxpayer
status cannot give standing to challenge disposal "under the Property
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... " Id.
2. "The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 18. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law ... ," id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, and such appropriation
"laws"-insofar as they exhibit the requisite telic connection-qualify no less than regulatory
statutes as "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" an enumerated power.
For elaboration of the telic requisite of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see DAVID E.
ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL ch. 3 (2d ed. 1987).
3. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... " U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2.
4. Moreover, the Property Clause authorizes not only spending, but also every other form
of disposal (including discard and destruction), as well as arrangements for the custody,
safekeeping, investment, and management of federal funds.
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Clause, Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2."' If, however, the power to spend is
actually conferred by the Property Clause, and not by the taxing
clause, the case law on taxpayer standing must be reconsidered, at
least.
The Supreme Court, discussing spending with reference to the
"general Welfare" phrase of the taxing clause, has said a "line must
... be drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and
general." 6 Where the line "shall be placed cannot be known through
a formula in advance of the event," it elaborated; "[t]here is a middle
ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large."7 This
means that for each federal spending measure, one by one and perhaps
provision by provision, it must be determined whether the spending
goal is "general" enough for the measure to be sustained.' If, on the
other hand, the spending power actually derives from the property
clause, this occasion for cavil disappears, for the latter authorizes
disposal whether or not any so-called "general Welfare" objective is
served.
Attributing the spending power to the taxing clause occasions a
more serious problem than the need to find some "general Welfare"
objective; for it easily induces the mistaken conclusion that promotion
of the general welfare, rather than merely the act of spending itself, is
within Congress' constitutional power. Thus, one can be easily misled
into believing that Congress may impose regulations to effectuate any
end toward which it has chosen to spend, regardless how extraneous it
is to the constitutionally enumerated powers.9
5. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982).
6. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
7. Id.
8. The significance of this issue has been diminished-but not eliminated-by the rule that
this discretion for the most part "is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to
Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment." Id.
9. As the Supreme Court said in 1936, "the phrase 'to provide for the general welfare'
qualifies the power 'to lay and collect taxes.' The view that the clause grants power to provide
for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively
accepted." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936).
In more recent dicta, however, the Supreme Court has declared that Congress' spending
power under the Taxing Clause "is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of
power by the Necessary and Proper Clause." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976). Steps
"necessary and proper" to carry out the spending process itself would not enlarge federal power
materially; but the Buckley dictum instead seems to contemplate laws helping to effectuate the ends
at which federal spending is aimed. On this mistaken view, Congress' power would indeed be
"quite expansive," for Congress may spend toward virtually any end, even though it is beyond the
enumerated powers, and therefore on this view of the Buckley dictum, it could regulate to promote
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Most of the current legal controversies over federal spending
involve whether and to what extent federal policies mandated as
funding conditions are enforceable against recipients or against non-
recipient program beneficiaries, and whether or to what extent such
federal policies are capable of preempting contrary state law. These
questions are too multifaceted and complex to examine exhaustively
here,' ° but their analysis is substantially determined by whence the
spending power derives. The powers conferred in Article I of the
Constitution (where the Taxing Clause is found) all are described as
"legislative Powers""-that is, powers of governance, or governmental
jurisdiction. The Article IV Property Clause, in contrast, confers
powers characteristic of ownership, and no governmental jurisdiction at
all. 2 If spending is a prerogative attributable to ownership, rather
than a governance power, funding conditions are enforceable as
contracts but not as statutes. Supremacy Clause consequences therefore
cannot ensue, so that state policies contrary to extraneous policy aims
of federal spending are not properly subject to preemption.
To which clause the spending power is attributed has ramifica-
tions even for the most fundamental legal issue regarding that power:
whether Congress may spend for purposes beyond its enumerated
powers at all. Every law student learns that James Madison thought
it could not, 3 while Alexander Hamilton argued it could.' 4 So long
any end whatsoever!
This view implicit in Buckley, of course, contradicts the passage quoted above from Butler,
and completely abrogates the principle of enumerated powers. The Buckley dictum thus illustrates
how easily the habit of associating spending with the so-called "General Welfare Clause" can lead
good minds into manifest error. Attributing the spending power to the Property Clause, on the
other hand, can help one avoid this error.
10. I discuss them at length in another article: David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44
DuKE L.J. 1 (1994). There was not sufficient space in that long article, on the other hand, to
examine the constitutional basis of the spending power, as is done here.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
12. See infra note 209 and text accompanying notes 209-12.
13. In 1817 Madison vetoed the "Bonus Bill" on this ground. Veto Message, March 3,
1817, in 1 J.D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584 (1896). The
Act incorporating the Second Bank of the United States (which Madison had signed in 1816)
required the Bank to pay a "bonus" of 1.5 million dollars to the United States; the "Bonus Bill,"
presented to Madison as his second term drew to its dose, designated that sum, plus periodic
dividends the Bank was to pay, a permanent fund to finance various internal improvements.
Madison vetoed the bill because he could not find internal improvements within the enumerated
powers. Id.
14. E.g., Alexander Hamilton's Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures,
Dec. 5,1791, in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 303-04 (Harold C. Syretted.,
1966). The great Justice and legal commentator of the next generation, Joseph Story, agreed.
See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 718 n.1, 727-28 (5th ed.
1891).
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as one conceives of the spending power as derived from the Taxing
Clause, the contest between Madison's view and Hamilton's remains
a draw. 5 If one looked elsewhere but found no basis except the
Necessary and Proper Clause, appropriation laws could be valid only
insofar as they were calculated "for carrying into Execution" some
enumerated power, and thus Madison's view must prevail. If,
however, one recognizes the spending power as based on the Property
Clause-which does not restrict dispositions of federal property to
those effectuating enumerated powers-Hamilton's view is vindicated.
Attention can then shift toward understanding the Hamiltonian thesis
more accurately and applying it more consistently than the courts have
done since 1937.16
This short list does not exhaust the implications of grounding
spending power doctrine on one clause rather than another of the
Constitution. I have dealt more elaborately with these and some other
implications in another place.
17
Constitutional law is not simply a branch of common law evolving
by accretion and adaptation of precedent. Under a written Constitu-
tion, at least until habitual neglect reduces it to metaphor, argument
tends to return sooner or later, and again and again, to the text.
Professor Powell has aptly identified "The Revolutionary Role of the
Text."'" Even propositions repeated for generations often lose their
credibility when impeached by careful study of the organic instrument.
This force of the text is not metaphysical, or mystical, or even
emotional, but rather dialectical and logical: At least where it is
somewhat more than epigraphic, when the text is carefully parsed it
15. In a monument of illogic, the Supreme Court in 1936 nominally endorsed Hamilton's
view while actually applying Madison's instead, using a "dual federalist" misreading of the Tenth
Amendment to foreclose spending objectives that no other enumerated power sustained. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). A year later, upholding provisions of the Social
Security Act in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937), the Supreme Court attempted to "distinguish" the 1936 case but failed to purge
its basic conceptual error. Since that time, misconceptions of Hamilton's thesis have served as
cover for extensions of federal control beyond anything Hamilton could have conceived, and
contrary to the view he actually maintained. Now, in the 1990's, Justice O'Connor has led a
majority of the Justices to the brink of repeating that 1936 mistake: She began her revival of the
Butler error in her dissenting opinion in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); and the other majority Justices failed to dissociate themselves from it
when she pressed it further in her opinion for the Court in New York v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992).
16. See generally David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994).
17. Id.
18. H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1427, 1433 (1986).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
can render some arguments untenable, others more or less credible, and
(occasionally) some all but ineluctable.
Other provisions might limit its use, but the language conferring
a power controls its inherent scope." It therefore is appropriate, and
might have far-reaching consequences, to reconsider the constitutional
basis of the federal spending power.
B. The Insufficiency of the Orthodox "Basis"
Orthodox doctrine attributes Congress' spending power to the
subordinate phrase, "to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States," in the clause
empowering Congress to lay and collect taxes. It is possible to
promote the "general Welfare" in some ways by the very act of
imposing a tax, as by taxing deleterious products or practices to make
them economically unattractive. However, tax imposition by itself can
do nothing to pay debts or to provide for defense. Orthodox doctrine
therefore relies on a process of inference that Justice Owen J. Roberts
in 1936 articulated this way:
The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the
general welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation...
can never accomplish the objects for which they were collected
unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax.
[Therefore t]he necessary implication from the terms of the grant is
that the public funds may be appropriated "to provide for the
general welfare of the United States."2
It seems odd that this rationale-generations old even when
Justice Roberts articulated it-has gone unchallenged for so long.
In the first place, since the only reason for seeking a basis in the
written Constitution is the principle of enumerated powers, it is
anomalous to rely on precisely such inference as that principle
generally precludes. The relevant language in the Taxing Clause is
merely allusive: At least in form, it certainly is not a grant of power.
The Constitution contains several similar instances of power being
alluded to in one provision, but actually granted by another. For
19. The words "to coin money," for example, are not apt to authorize the minting of
commemorative medallions or the printing of paper currency (although another grant of power
authorizes the latter, see Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870)). Similarly, the
power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States"-its scope ascertained by analysis
of those textual terms, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)-does not authorize
regulation of local business practices (although the Necessary and Proper Clause separately defines
a different power capable of supporting many such regulations).
20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
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example, Congress' power to constitute inferior courts is alluded to in
Article II121 but conferred by a clause in Article L22 A clause in one
section of Article I alludes to Congress' powers to tax and to regulate
commerce, and prohibits using those powers to create preferences
among ports;23 but those powers are conferred by clauses appearing in
a different section of that Article. 24  The so-called "Exceptions"
Clause in Article II125 alludes to the power Congress has regarding
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, but no such power is conferred
except by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 26 In all of these instanc-
es, to treat the clause that merely alludes to the power as instead
creating the power and prescribing its inherent scope offends the
principle of enumerated powers; and in some instances, the mistake has
profound ramifications.27
The clause commonly mischaracterized as the General Welfare
Clause has never been called the Common Defence Clause, although
its relevant language, to "provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States", makes parallel reference to both. Surely
this is because, while the Taxing Clause alludes to spending for
defense, the power to spend for defense obviously derives from other
language, drafted in suitable power-granting form, located elsewhere in
21. "[Sjuch inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. "The Congress shall have Power... To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
23. "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports
of one State over those of another ...." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, c. 6.
24. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cds. 1, 3. See also id. art. I, § 9, cls. 4, 5.
25. "[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction ... with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26. "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18.
27. The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to adjust Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction in ways adapted to effectuating the "judicial Power," which Article III of
the Constitution provides "shall extend to all Cases...arising under this Constitution ...."
However, the habit of misattributing Congress' power to adjust jurisdiction to the Exceptions
Clause (which lacks the means-to-end constraint found in the Necessary and Proper Clause) has
induced the mistaken opinion that laws "excepting" from Supreme Court attention various
categories of such cases (e.g., abortion and school prayer) would be constitutional, even if no other
federal forum for them remained. See generally David E. Engdahl, Federal Courts and Congress'
Power: Premises False and True (March, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Seattle
University Law Review).
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the Constitution.28 If the reference to "common Defence" spending
simply alludes to power conferred elsewhere, however, certainly it is
anomalous to consider the same language the source of whatever power
Congress might have to spend for the "general Welfare," or even "to
pay the Debts"!
Another reason to doubt this traditional attribution is that it fails
to provide any authority at all to spend money acquired otherwise than
by taxation.29 The federal treasury receives money from many other
sources, including penalties, fines, user fees, leases, surplus property
sales, gifts, bequests, and returns on investments. The spending
allusion in the Taxing Clause cannot credibly be twisted so far as to
authorize the spending of funds received from such sources. If such
funds are to be spent, some other authority for spending them must be
found.
Moreover, the funds accumulated from such miscellaneous sources
are negligible in comparison to those generated by the exercise of
Congress' power "[tio borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United
States .... "30 This Borrowing Clause makes no reference to
spending at all, and the spending allusion in the Taxing Clause does
not even colorably reach borrowed sums; yet borrowed money now
funds an enormous fraction of every federal budget. If Congress'
spending power really were based on the allusion to spending contained
in the Taxing Clause, spending on credit would be unconstitutional.
At the same time, since the only practical reasons to borrow are to
invest, to refund debt, or otherwise to spend, the borrowing power
itself would be superfluous and vain.
In addition, between receipt and disbursement something has to
be done with the federal government's money. There is a separate
requirement of regular accounting for receipts and expenditures, 3' but
nothing in the Taxing Clause confers even custodial authority over
federal funds, much less authority to safeguard or invest such funds
28. This power-granting language includes the language authorizing Congress to "support"
armies (subject to a restriction against appropriations for longer than two years), U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, ci. 12; that authorizing Congress to "maintain" a navy (subject to no such restriction), id.
art. I, § 8, d. 13; and the language authorizing Congress to make appropriations laws for carrying
the various powers regarding war and military activities into execution, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. The possibility of at least some revenue other than from federal taxes was plainly
contemplated in framing the Constitution. It provides that any state imposts or duties on imports
or exports beyond amounts absolutely necessary to fund state inspection laws "shall be for the Use
of the Treasury of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 2.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 7.
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before they are withdrawn "in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law."32
Unlike the Taxing Clause, the Property Clause provides ample
textual basis for the management and spending of all federal monies,
from whatever source derived. Nor is this merely fortuitous: The
purpose of this Article is to show that ensuring ample power to
manage and spend federal money was one of the several purposes for
which the Property Clause was deliberately designed.
I am not one who insists "the Framers' intent" should control
construction of the Constitution. However, in more than a quarter-
century of constitutional scholarship, I have found constant confirma-
tion of the observation I made in my youth, that
[d]iscovering the framers' forgotten intent can destroy the illusion
of necessity in an unsatisfactory but long established construction
and create the opportunity for a policy choice between alternative
constructions. And probably in constitutional law as in other fields
of law historical research in an effort to grasp a forgotten under-
standing can uncover the source of vexatious conceptual errors
which the legal mind has hitherto been unable to escape.33
The value of such inquiry, moreover, has been repeatedly confirmed
by the judiciary.
34
The following pages therefore meticulously examine the records
of the Constitutional Convention, and other materials from the
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cd. 7.
33. David E. Engdahl, Book Review, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119, 120-22 (1968) (reviewing
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (Alfred Avins ed., 1967)).
34. See, e.g., Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 491 n.15 (1978) (citing David E. Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972),
with arcane sources first unearthed by that article pervading the opinion); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 415 n.6 (1979) (citing David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972)); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 258-59 n.l (1985) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (citing
David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1 (1972)); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 465 n.16
(citing David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact Not
a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965), with arcane sources first unearthed by that article
pervading the opinion); id. at 482 n.3 (White & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (citing David E.
Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965)); Illinois v. Michigan, 409 U.S. 36, 36 n.* (1972) (citing David E.
Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965)); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 452, 453 (1981) (Rehnquist, Burger,
& Steward, JJ., dissenting) (citing David E. Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts: A
Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REv. 987 (1965)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587 (1985) (O'Connor, Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (citing David
E. Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 93 (1985)).
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founding period, to show how the Framers of the Constitution
attended to the necessity for a sufficient textual authorization of
spending. Heretofore overlooked details are brought to light by this
sometimes tedious explication, and the reader who endures will emerge
with considerable confidence about the basis of the spending power.
The experience should also confirm that even after generations of
scholars have culled them, these historical materials can still yield new
insights to those who afford them patient and reflective examination.
III. THE USAGE OF THE "GENERAL WELFARE" PHRASE
A. "General Welfare" As a Preambulatory Phrase
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the phrase "general
welfare" was used in the first Resolution prepared by the Virginians
and introduced by their Governor Randolph on May 29. That First
Randolph Resolution was preambulatory in character, and the "general
welfare" phrase was enclosed in quotation marks. The Resolution said:
"Resolved, that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;
namely . . . 'common defence, security of liberty and general wel-
fare."' 35  The quoted phrases (or close approximations thereto) had
actually been used in the Articles of Confederation to state the
objectives of that first instrument of union.36
The next day, on Randolph's own motion, his First Resolution
was replaced by three separate propositions, only one of which made
reference to "defence, . . liberty and general welfare."37  That one
proposition was passed over without being put to a vote,38 and then
lay neglected until near the end of the Convention when the Commit-
tee on Style and Arrangement used its language to enliven the drab
35. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 20 (Madison), 30
(Journal), 33 (Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS].
36. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 3. The Articles of Confederation were
recommended by the Continental Congress in 1777. The last State to approve them was
Maryland, in 1781.
37. The three substitute propositions were:
1. that a Union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the objects
proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common defence, security of liberty,
& genl. welfare.
2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as individual
sovereignties, would be sufficient.
3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 33 (Madison); see I id. at 30-31 (Journal).
38. See 1 id. at 30-32 (Journal), 33-38 (Madison), 38-44 (Yates & McHenry).
[Vol. 18:215
The Basis of the Spending Power
preamble 9 approved by the delegates earlier. The improved pream-
ble declares that among the purposes of the Constitution are: "to
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
.... ,,40 As this preamble recites, the Constitution was calculated to
render "more perfect" the Union already established by the Articles to
promote those same objectives, identified in the Articles as "common
defence," "security of ... Liberties," and "mutual and general
welfare."4 A study of the "general welfare" phrase, therefore, should
begin with its use in the Articles of Confederation.
Benjamin Franklin proposed his "Articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union" to the Continental Congress a year before indepen-
dence was even claimed 42  At that time, Franklin envisioned "The
United Colonies of North America" remaining under British rule, but
joining together in "Confederation and perpetual Union. ' 43 Accord-
ing to his Article II, the colonies should unite "for their common
Defence . . . for the Security of their Liberties and Propertys, the
Safety of their Persons and Families, and their mutual and general
Welfare. "4
Franklin's confederation proposal was not immediately pursued.
However, in June, 1776, when the Continental Congress at last
resolved upon independence and appointed a committee to draft an
appropriate "declaration," it authorized another committee "to prepare
and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these
colonies."4  On July 12, that committee reported a draft in the
39. "We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the
following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity." See 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 35, at 565 (Farrand's compilation of the Proceedings of Convention
Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement).
40. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 590 (Report of the Committee of Style).
41. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 3.
42. Franklin's document was dated May 10, 1775, and apparently received some
consideration on July 21 that year. It is printed in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 195-199 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905) (edited from original records
in the Library of Congress) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].
43. Preamble and Article I, in 2 id. at 195.
44. Article II, in 2 id. at 195.
45. 5 id. at 431 (1906). John Adams reports a similar resolution having been proposed in
mid-February. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 5 id. at 1069, 1072.
The committee consisted of "a member from each colony," and was appointed on June 12, 1776.
5 id. at 432-33.
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handwriting of John Dickinson, which incorporated much of Franklin's
proposal but enlarged and made fundamental changes to it.
46
The Dickinson draft was printed,47 and then revised in the
Committee of the Whole.48 The revised draft was reported on
August 20." Further action was long delayed by delegate absences
and the exigencies of war: Although the August 20 draft received
some attention during the following spring and summer, it was not
given priority until October, 1777. The Articles were at last finished
and submitted to the States on November 15, 1777.50
As preambulatory generalities, Franklin's statements regarding the
objectives of union proved acceptable. The specifics of his plan,
however, contemplated much greater consolidation than many found
tolerable once the spirit of independence was aflame. The prevailing
sentiment is exemplified by the response to Franklin's proposal that
congressional seats be apportioned among the colonies according to
their voting populations, with each delegate having one vote.51
Emphasizing the separate identities, prerogatives, and primacy of the
individual states, the Dickinson draft rejected that scheme in favor of
one vote for each state regardless of its population or the size of its
delegation 2 (the rule being followed in the Continental Congress
itself).
During debate on August 1, 1776, Franklin moved to amend the
Dickinson plan by inserting apportionment and voting provisions like
those his own draft had proposed. 3 In support of Franklin's motion,
John Adams of Massachusetts urged that
[T]he individuality of the colonies is a mere sound ... the
confederacy is to make us one individual only; it is to form us, like
46. See 5 id. at 546-54.
47. 5 id. at 555.
48. Bits of the deliberations on certain days are known from John Adams' Notes of Debates
in the Continental Congress, see 5 id. at 1076-1083 (1906), and from Thomas Jefferson's Notes of
Debates in the Continental Congress, see 5 id. at 1085, 1098-1106.
49. 5 id. at 672, 689 (1906). The Dickinson Draft and the August 20 Draft are printed in
parallel columns in 5 id. at 674-89.
50. 9 id. at 906-25 (1907).
51. See arts. VII and VIII, in 2 id. at 197 (1905).
52. See arts. XVI and XVII, in 5 id. at 680-81, col. 1 (1906).
53. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1080-82 (1906).
One delegate moved that votes be proportional to what each state paid; another said, "[t]he vote
should be taken two ways; call the Colonies, and call the individuals, and have a majority of
both." 6 id. A third argued that "the smaller states should be secured in all questions concerning
life or liberty, and the greater ones in all respecting property. [H]e therefore proposed that in
votes relating to money, the voice of each colony should be proportioned to the number of it's
[sic] inhabitants." Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1102.
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separate parcels of metal, into one common mass. [W]e shall no
longer retain our separate individuality, but become a single
individual as to all questions submitted to the confederacy.
[T]herefore all those reasons which prove the justice and expediency
of equal representation in other assemblies, hold good here. 4
Pennsylvania's young Dr. Benjamin Rush added that "[w]e have been
too free with the word independence; we are dependent on each other,
not totally independent States." 5 And James Wilson of Pennsylvania
said: "[A]s to those matters which are referred to Congress, we are not
so many states; we are one large state. [W]e lay aside our individuality
whenever we come here .... ,,56
However, Franklin's August 1 motion was disapproved, 7 and a
determination to proceed as affiliated but independent and predomi-
nantly autonomous states prevailed. The most outspoken opponent 8
of Franklin's motion was Rev. John Witherspoon, President of the
College of New Jersey (later Princeton), who argued "that nothing
relating to individuals could ever come before Congress; nothing but
what would respect colonies. [H]e distinguished between an incorpo-
rating and a federal union." 9  The sentiment against consolidation
was very strong in 1776 and 1777, and the Articles therefore grew
more protective of state prerogative with each successive draft. This
54. 6 id. at 1104.
55. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1081.
We are now a new nation. [Voting by States] will promote factions in Congress and in
the States; it will prevent the growth of freedom in America. If we vote by numbers,
liberty will be always safe .... Montesquieu pronounces the confederation of Lycia,
the best that ever was made; the cities had different weights in the scale ....
6 id. By Thomas Jefferson's account, Dr. Rush said: "[W]ere it possible to collect the whole
body of the people together, they would determine the questions submitted to them, by their
majority." "[W]hy should not the same majority decide, when voting here by their representa-
tives?" Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1105.
56. 6 id. at 1105.
[Ilt has been said that Congress is a representation of states, not of individuals. I say
that the objects of it's [sic] care are all the individuals of the states. [Ilt is strange that
annexing the name of "State" to ten thousand men, should give them an equal right
with forty thousand. [T]his must be the effect of magic, not of reason.
6 id.
57. At least three different alternatives to one vote per state were proposed a year later, on
October 7, 1777, but each was defeated. The proposition that "each State shall have one vote"
was then approved, with even Pennsylvania's (different) delegation voting for it. 9 id. at 778-82
(1907).
58. Connecticut, New York, and North and South Carolina were said not to be strongly
inclined either way. See John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1082
(1906) (remarks of S. Hopkins).
59. Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 id. at 1103.
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is most manifest in its provisions regarding the central governance
power, to which we now turn.
B. The "General Welfare" Phrase and the Principle of Enumerated
Powers
Franklin had used the "general welfare" phrase not only for the
preambulatory purpose of his Article II, but also to define the
lawmaking authority of the central Congress he proposed. His Article
V said that Congress should "make such general Ordinances as
tho[ught] necessary to the General Welfare, [which] particular
Assemblies cannot be competent to."60 He elaborated this generality
by specifying "those that may relate to our general Commerce; or
general Currency; to the Establishment of Posts; and the Regulation of
our common Forces."' 61 However, Franklin seems to have conceived
this short list as illustrative rather than definitive.
In contrast, the Dickinson draft omitted Franklin's "general
welfare" phrase, and listed with particularity several matters as to
which "[t]he United States assembled shall have the sole and exclusive
Right and Power."62  Much of the time the Continental Congress
devoted to the Articles was spent chiseling this list of centralized
lawmaking powers.63
60. Art. V, in 2 id. at 196 (1905).
61. Art. V, in 2 id. at 196. Apparently his original wording was, "Ordinances... necessary
to the General Welfare... such as may relate to" those particulars. That was then changed to
"Ordinances ... necessary to the General Welfare ... viz. those that may relate to" those
particulars. Art. V, in 2 id. at 196 (emphasis added).
62. Art. XVIII, in 5 id. at 681-85, col. 1 (1906).
Dickinson's draft also added after the particularizing list a clause declaring that "the United
States assembled shall never... interfere in the internal Police of any Colony, any further than
such Police may be affected by the Articles of this Confederation." 5 id. at 685, col. 1. The
Committee of the Whole deleted this clause, see art. XIV, in 5 id. at 685, col. 2, but no
explanation for this deletion survives. Perhaps at first it was thought redundant once the changes
in Article III, discussed in the text, had been made. Further reflection would indicate, however,
that language merely reserving such power as "shall not interfere with" central governance is
considerably less protective against centralization than the provision in the Dickinson draft that
"the United States ... shall never ... interfere in the internal Police" of states except as the
Articles authorize. This is probably why the clause about powers "not ... expressly delegated"
was later added.
63. This constituted Article XIV of the August 20, 1776 draft of the Committee of the
Whole, which became Article IX of the finished Articles of Confederation.
One alteration made in the list of particulars by the Committee of the Whole seems much
more than mere refinement. The Dickinson list would have given the Congress "Authority for
the... Welfare of the United Colonies and every of them." 5 id. at 683, col. 1. But this was
displaced by language authorizing the Congress to create a council and such committees and
officers "as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States... 5 id. at
col. 2.
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The reaction against Franklin's idea of broad central legislative
authority manifested also in the evolution of a different provision. In
addition to extending the power of the Congress under his Article V
as far as "the General Welfare," Franklin had contemplated that
individual colonies, should they so choose, might surrender authority
even over internal affairs. His Article III provided that "each Colony
shall enjoy and retain as much as it may think fit of its own present
Laws, Customs, Rights, Privileges, and peculiar Jurisdictions within its
own Limits .... ."64 In contrast, to preclude states from yielding
more than the Articles would require, the Dickinson draft qualified this
by adding a declaration that each state "reserves to itself the sole and
exclusive Regulation and Government of its internal police, in all
matters that shall not interfere with the Articles of this Confedera-
tion."6  Then the Committee of the Whole deleted Franklin's
original language, so that by August 20, 1776, Article III consisted of
the Dickinson draft's reservation clause alone. 66  When this was
considered again in April of the following year, it was replaced with a
reservation clause even less tolerant of consolidation, which declared:
"Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."67
When the Constitutional Convention assembled a decade later,
however, the more substantial apprehensions were not over consolida-
tion but over disintegration. In the words Edmund Randolph used to
elaborate the first Resolution he and his fellow Virginians proposed,
most Americans had come to believe that "a national Government
ought to be established" because "a Union of the States merely federal
64. 2 id. at 196 (1905).
65. Art. III, in 5 id. at 675, col. 1 (1906).
66. 5 id. at col. 2.
67. 9 id. at 908, col. 2 (1907). This change came at the urging of North Carolina's Thomas
Burke, who said the delegates were slow at first to understand its significance but then debated
it for two days. Letter of Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell (April 29, 1777), in 6 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 671, 672 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1980). The provision
also was re-prioritized from Article III to Article II.
Two other similar caveats were also added. First the Congress' authority to enter into
treaties was subjected to the proviso that "no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the
legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties
on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or
importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever... " Motion approved October
23, 1777, in 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 833, 834 (1907);
see also art. IX, in 9 id. at 915, col. 2. Second, Congress' authority to regulate trade with the
Indians and otherwise to manage Indian affairs was subjected to the proviso that "the legislative
right of any State, within its own limits be not infringed or violated." Motion approved October
28, 1777, in 9 id. at 845; see also Art. IX, in 9 id. at 919, col. 2.
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will not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of Confedera-
tion .... 6
The proposal that "a national government" replace the "merely
federal" scheme of the Articles of Confederation precipitated new
debate over the apportionment of membership and votes in the
Congress.6' Only after some weeks was that disagreement compro-
mised by acceptance of a different rule for each of two distinct houses.
In contrast, so firm was the conviction that the Congress, however
constituted, must have more authority than the Articles of Confedera-
tion allowed that it took scarcely any time at all to reach agreement on
the appropriate scope of national legislative power.
The Sixth Randolph Resolution proposed would have authorized
the central legislature "to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to
which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Legislation . ".. 70 According to Madison's notes, the portion of this
Resolution which merely carried forward the powers conferred by the
Articles was promptly given "a silent affirmative nem. con ' 71 on May
31.72 About the more general phrases, however, substantial misgiv-
ings might well have been expected.
The references to matters in which "the separate States are
incompetent" and those in which separate legislation might interrupt
"harmony" were equivalent in their generality, and comparable in
apparent meaning, to the terms "Ordinances . . . necessary to the
General Welfare, [which] particular Assemblies cannot be competent
to," used by Franklin a decade before.73 At that time, every subse-
quent draft beginning with Dickinson's had rejected such generality in
favor of jealous particularity, and even devised additional language to
emphasize and preserve state prerogatives. The mood in 1787,
however, was very different. Eventually a principle of enumeration
would prevail, but one far less miserly and far less restrictive than the
Articles had imposed.
68. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 33 (Madison); see I id. at 30-31 (Journal).
69. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 33-38 (Madison).
70. 1 id. at 21 (Madison).
71. Nemine Contradicente: no one contradicting. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1287 (2d ed. 1987).
72. 1 id. at 53 (Madison).
73. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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Three South Carolina delegates 74 at first objected to the phrase,
"to which the separate States are incompetent." They thought it too
vague and invasive of state prerogative, and said they must have "an
exact enumeration" before they could vote.75 But Randolph, declaring
that he, too, opposed inroads on state jurisdiction, "disclaimed any
intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature."76
Madison-who of course had participated in drafting the Virginia
proposals-added that "he had brought with him into the Convention
a strong bias in favor of an enemeration [sic] and definition of the
powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had
also brought doubts concerning its practicability. '77 Apparently the
assurances of Madison and Randolph persuaded the South Carolinians
because when the "incompetent" phrase was put to a vote it was
approved without dissent; no state but Connecticut even divided.78
The equally nebulous "harmony" phrase was also approved, with no
record of discussion or dissent.79
The Sixth Resolution was not specifically discussed further until
July 17, when Roger Sherman (whose unhappiness with its wording
had caused Connecticut's earlier division) moved to substitute different
language. Sherman's objection was not to the use of generalities
instead of "exact enemeration [sic];" however he moved that the
legislature be authorized
[t]o make laws ... in all cases which may concern the common
interests of the Union: but not to interfere with the government of
the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect
74. John Rutledge, Pierce Butler, and Charles Pinckney. Probably not by mere coincidence,
South Carolina's delegates also had been the first to support Thomas Burke's 1777 amendment
to Article II of the Confederation. See Letter of Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell (April 29,
1777), in 6 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 671, 672 (Paul H. Smith ed.,
1980).
75. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 53 (Madison).
76. 1 id.
77. 1 id. Madison told the delegates that they should do whatever "should be found
essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the
Community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it
must, however reluctantly, be submitted to." 1 id.
78. 1 id. at 53-54 (Madison). The negative vote splitting Connecticut was that of Roger
Sherman. See I id. at 54 (Madison). He thought the proposition "too indefinitely expressed,"
yet thought "it would be hard to define all the powers by detail." I id. at 59-60 (Pierce). He
later would offer a substitute proposal of his own. See infra text accompanying note 79.
79. 1 id. at 54 (Madison).
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the government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare
of the United States is not concerned. 0
Sherman's motion was the first at the Convention to use the actual
phrase "general welfare" in more than a merely preambulatory role.
Sherman used "general welfare" (and the equally general phrase
"common interests of the Union") here comparably to the use of it in
Franklin's Article V defining the Congress' lawmaking power, rather
than Franklin's preambulatory Article 1I.81 In Franklin's Article V,
Franklin had instanced the generality with his examples of "Com-
merce; . . .Currency; . . .Posts; and . . . common Forces." 2  In a
like manner, "Mr. Sherman, in explanation of his ideas read an
enumeration of powers ". -83 However, apparently still convinced
(as he had observed more than six weeks before) that "it would be hard
to define all the powers by detail, '"84 Sherman opted for Franklin's
general phrase instead of using enumeration to circumscribe the federal
government's concerns.
Sherman's motion failed,8" but an ensuing one by Gunning
Bedford of Delaware was approved. 6 Bedford's motion added a
phrase to the Sixth Randolph Resolution authorizing Congress "to
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union."87 We do
not know whether Sherman's use of the compendious "general welfare"
and "common interests" phrases had evoked any statements of concern;
but Bedford's reference to "general interests" prompted Randolph
himself to exclaim: "This is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the
80. 2 id. at 21 (Journal). Madison's record of the language of this motion, 2 id. at 25
(Madison), is considerably less dear.
Sherman had affirmed earlier "that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to
Gongs. and that additional powers were necessary." 1 id. at 34 (Madison). He believed "also that
the General and particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent." 1 id. at 34-35
(Madison). This is probably why this motion copied the Articles in trying to delimit national by
state power. Sherman's phrase, however, resembled Dickinson's "never interfere" clause more
closely than it did the Articles' ultimate Article II, retaining "sovereignty" to the States.
81. See supra text accompanying note 60.
82. Art. V, in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 196; see
also supra text accompanying note 61.
83. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 26 (Madison). Sherman's explanatory list has
not survived.
84. 1 id. at 59-60 (Pierce). Sherman had made this observation on May 31st when the Sixth
Resolution was first discussed. See 1 id. at 59-60 (Pierce).
85. 2 id. at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison).
86. 2 id. at 21 (Journal), 27 (Madison).
87. 2 id. at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison).
[Vol. 18:215
The Basis of the Spending Power
power of violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and of
intermeddling with their police.""8
Notwithstanding Randolph's objection, Bedford's motion was
approved. 9 Consequently, while the phrase "general welfare" was
not included in the resolution defining the legislative power, Bedford's
"general interests" was, as it was approved and referred to the
Committee of Detail late in July.90
However, the exchange over Bedford's motion apparently
rekindled interest in the idea of enumerating rather than generalizing
Congress' powers. Randolph himself was a member of the Committee
of Detail, and in an early draft for the Committee, he tried his hand
at the task of enumeration.91 His list underwent revision, but the
Detail Committee did use the enumeration technique in its August 6
Report. 92  This shift by the Committee from generalization to
enumeration excited no objection from the other delegates, whose only
responses through the remainder of the Convention were some efforts
to ensure an enumeration sufficient to cover all that the generalizations
had been thought to comprehend.
Enumeration had quite a different significance in 1787 than in
1777, however. The Constitution's enumeration was not accompanied
by adamant assertions of state priority and prerogative comparable to
those characterizing the Articles of Confederation.93 In the Constitu-
tion, enumeration was undertaken not to repudiate the generalities of
the Sixth Randolph Resolution (which earlier had been repeatedly
approved), but rather to articulate them in greater detail. Under the
Constitution, consequently, Congress' powers are not delimited by
those of the states.
On the other hand, unlike Franklin's specification of "Com-
merce," "Currency," "Post," and "common Forces," '94 and the
enumeration Sherman had used to explain his motion of July 17,95
enumeration in the Constitution was not merely to illustrate what might
be comprehended by the generalities. Possibilities within the displaced
88. 2 id. at 26 (Madison).
89. 2 id. at 21 (Journal), 27 (Madison).
90. See 2 id. at 131 (Committee of Detail, I).
91. See 2 id. at 142-44 (Committee of Detail, IV).
92. See 2 id. at 181-82 (Madison).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
94. See supra text accompanying note 61.
95. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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general phrases, but not fairly within the enumeration that displaced
them, did not remain constitutionally permissible.96
To suppose otherwise would vitiate the principle of enumeration.
Since the constitutional enumeration details what the displaced
generalities were thought to comprehend, those generalities certainly
should inform the construction and application of the enumerating
clauses; but every assertion of federal power must be sufficiently
grounded in the document's text. The decision to enumerate rather
than rest on generalities means that, as to domestic affairs,97 all
suggestions of general, implicit, or inherent federal power must fail.
The significance of this shift from generalization to enumeration
can be illustrated with the taxing power. Power to tax was one power
denied by the Articles of Confederation, which all agreed the new
central government must have. Nonetheless, even while specifying that
federal courts should have jurisdiction to enforce federal revenue
laws, 98 the original Randolph Resolutions did not specify any taxing
power for Congress. Similarly, although the resolutions referred to the
Committee of Detail contained several references to national taxes99
they articulated no taxing power.
This, however, was not anomalous so long as Congress' power
was described in ample generalities-as it was both in the Sixth
Randolph Resolution and in its derivative referred to the Committee
of Detail. Only with the shift to enumeration did it become imperative
that any taxing power, in order to exist, be articulated more specifical-
ly. Accordingly, when it opted for enumeration, the Committee of
Detail inserted a new clause saying "[t]he Legislature of the United
States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises.""°
By the same token, of course, the shift from generalization to
enumeration caused federal spending competence to depend upon
inclusion in the Constitution's text of sufficient authorizing language.
96. Their mistaken view that they did was maintained in Robert Stem, That Commerce
Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (1934).
97. The same cannot be said of power for international affairs, where the principle of
enumerated powers does not apply. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
IN A NUTSHELL §§ 9.01-9.03 (2d ed. 1987); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION ch. 1 (1972).
98. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 22 (Madison).
99. The referred resolutions provided that representation be proportioned to direct taxes;
required that direct taxes be apportioned according to a census; and required that bills for raising
money originate in the "first Branch of the Legislature." Resolutions referred to Committee of
Detail, 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 131 (Committee of Detail, I).
100. 2 id. at 181 (Madison).
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Power to spend could no more be left to inference than could power to
tax, to regulate commerce, or to maintain an army or navy.
C. The "General Welfare" Phrase and Spending
Under the Articles of Confederation the central government, even
though it had no power to tax, had ample authority to spend any funds
it collected as requisitions from the States or otherwise. In fact, in
sharp contrast to its niggled and hobbled law-making power, the
Congress' spending power under the Articles was virtually unrestricted.
Article VI of Franklin's 1775 proposal provided that not only all
"Charges of Wars," but also "all other general Expences to be incurr'd
for the common Welfare, shall be defray'd out of a common Treasury
-101
This "common welfare" phrase is materially indistinguishable
from the "general welfare" phrase used in Franklin's Article V to
define the Congress' law-making power. 102 In order to cabin that
law-making power, the draftsmen of the Articles of Confederation had
repudiated this generality and employed narrow particularization
instead. In remarkable contrast, however, they never even attempted to
confine spending more narrowly than Franklin's generalization had
proposed.
Instead, Franklin's language authorizing spending for the common
or general welfare was carried forward without substantial change to
Article XI of the Dickinson draft,10 3 and thence to Article IX of the
August 20 draft, which said: "All charges of wars and all other
expences that shall be incurred for the common defence, or general
welfare, and allowed by the United States Assembled, shall be defrayed
out of a common treasury . ".1..,4 Article IX, which also dealt with
how the cost of supplying the common treasury should be allocated
among the several states, was discussed more frequently and more
extensively in the Continental Congress than any other provision of the
Articles of Confederation except the one dealing with the law-making
power. °5  Yet no qualification or modification of the "general
101. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 196.
102. See supra text accompanying note 60.
103. Article XI of the Dickinson Draft provided: "All Charges of Wars and all other
Expences that shall be incurred for the common Defence, or general Welfare, and allowed by the
United States assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common Treasury .... 5 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 677-678, col. 1 (1906).
104. 5 id. at col. 2.
105. Article IX was discussed almost every day for a week from October 7 through 14,
1777. See 9 id. at 781, 785, 788, 793, 797, 800, 801 (1907).
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welfare" phrase in the context of spending appears to have been
suggested at any time.1" 6 As finally adopted, the spending provision
read: "All charges of war and all other expences, that shall be incurred
for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United
States, in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common
treasury . "...107
The Journals of the Continental Congress contain some examples
of expenditures characterizable as for the "general welfare" although
not undertaken to implement law-making powers. Indeed, until the
Articles of Confederation became effective, the Continental Congress
had no law-making power at all, yet it spent a great deal of mon-
ey-and not just for cannonballs, powder, and other materiel of war.
In January 1877, for example, Congress authorized one thousand
dollars for gifts to some needy, but friendly and peaceable Indians in
Pennsylvania. ' 8  One might suppose that this charity, extended
while England was seeking to exploit any occasion for disaffection
among native populations, would also have strategic ramifications.
However, doubtless it reflected the same humanitarian considerations
that had induced Franklin in his 1775 draft not only to provide against
"Injustice in the Trade with" the Indians, but also to authorize officials
"at our general Expence by occasional small Supplies, to relieve their
personal Wants and Distresses. ' 09  At the time of that donation,
before the Articles were in force, all governance power reposed in the
separate states; the occasion therefore demonstrates that power to
govern and power to spend money were not considered as commensu-
rate at all. Thus, it should not seem surprising that central govern-
ment spending could be deemed for the "general welfare" even though
not effectuating any central governance power.
The Randolph Resolutions, unlike the Articles of Confederation,
included no explicit authorization to spend at all.' Again, however,
that was because the Virginians had employed generalization instead
of enumeration: One generalization in the Sixth Randolph Resolution
106. The only changes made were styling changes by the committee appointed to "revise
and arrange" the approved articles, 9 id. at 900, 902, or "small amendments made in the diction,
without altering the sense .... " 9 id. at 907, before the final version was approved on November
15.
107. Art. VIII, in 9 id. at 913, col. 2. A clause in Article IX provided that "[tihe united
states in congress assembled shall never . . . ascertain the sums and expences necessary for the
defence and welfare of the united states, or any of them ... unless nine states assent to the same
. . 9 id. at 921-922.
108. 7 id. at 62-63 (1907).
109. Art. XI, in 2 id. at 198 (1905).
110. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 20-22 (Madison).
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was that the legislature should "enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation, '11 and among these was the power
conferred by Article VIII to defray "all... expences... incurred for
the ... general welfare.""' 2 When the Committee of Detail opted
for enumeration, of course, such incorporation by reference could no
longer be employed; and, accordingly, a draft for the Detail Committee
in James Wilson's handwriting proposed authorizing federal revenues
"to be applied to such [federal] Purposes as [Congress] shall deem
proper and expedient .... ""'
Wilson's proposal, however, was not approved by the Committee.
Instead-ironically-while it enumerated more substantial powers of
governance than the Articles of Confederation had allowed, the August
6 Report of the Committee of Detail subjected the spending competence
of the central government to unprecedented constraint. The only
language in the Committee's Report authorizing any spending at all
was the same language the Committee had devised for dealing with the
myriad details of organizing the government and effectuating its
various enumerated powers.
That language contemplated power for the national legislature "to
make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this
Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."I 4 While ample to authorize spending
to execute the various enumerated powers, this clause would not
authorize any spending for purposes extraneous to that enumeration.
Thus, the Detail Committee's Report contemplated a spending
111. See supra text accompanying note 70.
112. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII.
113. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 157 (Committee of Detail, VIII). This latter
was copied from the "New Jersey Plan" introduced by Patterson on June 15. See 1 id. at 242-43
(Madison).
An earlier Detail Committee draft in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph had proposed
authorizing the use of tax revenues "for the past and future debts and necessities of the union."
2 id. at 142 (Committee of Detail, IV).
114. 2 id. at 182 (Madison). The Convention approved this "necessary and proper" clause
on August 20. 2 id. at 345 (Madison).
The Committee's Report also provided that money could be drawn from the treasury only
pursuant to appropriations originating as House bills, Report of Committee of Detail, Art. IV,
§ 5, in 2 id. at 178 (Madison); see also Resolutions submitted to Committee of Detail, in 2 id. at
131 (Committee of Detail, I); and that bills upon final approval would become "laws," Report of
Committee of Detail, Art. VI, § 13, in 2 id. at 181 (Madison). For convention actions pursuant
to these suggestions, see 2 id. at 509 (Madison). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 1; id. art.
I, § 9, d. 7.
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competence substantially curtailed from the essentially unrestricted
spending power existing under the Articles of Confederation.
Had the completed Constitution contained no provision for
spending other than this, Madison's thesis that the spending power is
limited to effectuating other enumerated powers would have been
sound. The fact is, however, that the delegates judged the Detail
Committee's Report deficient in this regard. Before they were finished,
they would have added to the evolving text another authorization for
spending that renders Madison's thesis untenable.
No other language relevant to spending was considered until
August 18, when James Madison and Charles Pinckney and others
submitted lists of additional powers for Congress deemed within the
generalizations of Randolph's Sixth Resolution, but not enumerated in
the August 6 Report of the Committee of Detail." 5  These lists,
which were referred to the same Detail Committee for consider-
ation,1 16 included several particulars that would involve spending.
One of them was power "[t]o secure the payment of the public
debt."1"7
Later the same day, on a motion by John Rutledge, the delegates
appointed a "grand committee" consisting of one delegate from each
state to "consider the necessity and expediency" of the United States
assuming all the state debts."' Consequently, at the same time the
debts issue was on referral to the Committee of Detail, it was under
consideration by this "grand committee," too. The "grand committee"
reported on August 21,19 and the Detail Committee submitted its
supplemental report on August 22.120 Discussion of the latter was
"postponed that each member Might furnish himself with a copy,' ' 21
and the "grand committee's" proposal was considered first.
That "grand committee" proposal used the "general welfare"
phrase, but it used that phrase in a peculiar and narrow way. It said:
115. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 321-22 (Journal), 324-26 (Madison). On the
same date, the delegates approved a floor amendment adding the words "and support" to the
clause authorizing the legislature to "raise Armies." 2 id. at 329 (Madison). No discussion of that
amendment is reported, and it was agreed to "nem. con." 2 id.
116. 2 id. at 321 (Journal), 325 (Madison).
117. 2 id. at 322 (Journal), 326 (Madison).
118. See 2 id. at 322 (Journal), 327 (Madison). Some other matters debated that day
referred to this committee, too. Similar "grand committees" (or "committees of eleven") were
formed on some other occasions.
119. 2 id. at 355-56 (Madison).
120. 2 id. at 366-67 (Madison).
121. 2 id. at 376 (Madison).
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The Legislature of the United-States shall have power to fulfil the
engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to
discharge as well the debts of the United States, as the debts
incurred by the several States during the late war, for the common
defence and general welfare.122
By this context and grammar, both the "general welfare" phrase and
its companion phrase, "common defence," were confined in meaning
to the common cause of the revolution, in which most of the debts
then existing had been incurred.
This proposal of the grand committee was not adopted, however.
Instead, the delegates on August 22 approved a substitute proposal of
Gouverneur Morris which declared simply: "The Legislature shall
fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the United
States. ' 123 The "general welfare" phrase thus disappeared.
On August 23, this language was conjoined to the Taxing Clause
so as to provide: "The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and
discharge the debts of the United-States, and shall have the power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. "124 This conjunc-
tion, however, was undone two days later because of objections to
Morris' word "shall." It was argued that "shall fulfil" would foreclose
such options as buying up paper at discount, thus arguably enhancing
the security of public creditors and entailing somewhat greater public
expense. 12' Edmund Randolph therefore moved to "postpone"
126
that language in favor of a clause providing simply that "all debts
contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the authority of
Congress shall be as valid against the United States under this
constitution as under the confederation.- 127  This clause was ap-
proved on August 25,12' and it survives in the finished Constitu-
tion. 129
It is important to notice that this clause approved on August
25-unlike the grand committee's proposal and even Morris' substi-
122. 2 id. at 352 (Journal).
123. 2 id. at 368 (Journal); see also 2 id. at 377 (Madison).
124. 2 id. at 382 (Journal); see also 2 id. at 392 (Madison).
125. 2 id. at 413 (Madison).
126. Neither the Journal nor Madison's notes explicitly declare that approval of this motion
to "postpone" deleted Morris' language from the Taxing Clause. It must have been regarded as
having that effect, however, because otherwise the objectionable word "shall" would have
remained.
127. 2 id. at 408 (Journal); see also 2 id. at 414 (Madison).
128. 2 id. at 408 (Journal).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
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tute-confers no authority to pay such debts.130  The need for some
adequate grant of relevant power could hardly have been overlooked at
the time, however. The submission of lists of additional powers on
August 18 shows that the delegates by then understood the principle
of enumeration quite well. Randolph himself, discussing on August 22
the grand committee's proposal (which did confer payment power), had
remarked that he "thought such a provision necessary; for though the
U. States will be bound, the new Govt. will have no authority in the
case unless it be given to them."''
The delegates did, indeed, perceive the necessity of an enumerat-
ing grant of power sufficient to embrace payment of the debts; and
they did answer that necessity, as data examined elsewhere show.
13 2
They also, a few days later, added the "general welfare" phrase in the
form ultimately approved as the Taxing Clause of Article I, Section 10;
but this addition had nothing to do with the perceived need for
enumerating a power to spend.
According to Madison's notes, on August 25, after Randolph's
language affirming the validity of prior debts had been approved,
Roger Sherman said that he
thought it necessary to connect with the clause for laying taxes
duties &c an express provision for the object of the old debts
&c-and moved to add to the 1st. clause of 1st. sect-of art VII
[the taxing clause of the Detail Committee's August 6 Report] "for
the payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences that
shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare."' 33
130. Spending to pay debts incurred earlier, during the Revolution and Confederation
periods, could not be considered spending "for carrying into Execution the ... Powers vested by"
the new Constitution particularly if the national government should assume the states' debts, as
was proposed. To authorize payment of those debts, therefore, language different from that of
the Necessary and Proper Clause was required.
131. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 377 (Madison). Randolph's early draft in
the Committee of Detail had authorized debt payment by express language distinct from his
latitudinous "necessities of the union" phrase. See 2 id. at 142 (Committee of Detail, IV). We
do not know whether that debt payment language was omitted by the Committee inadvertently
or over Randolph's dissent. One other member of the Committee of Detail, Oliver Ellsworth,
seems to have been somewhat oblivious on this point. See 2 id. at 377 (Madison). Madison
"thought it necessary to give the authority in order to prevent misconstruction." 2 id.
132. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 109 et seq.
133. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 414 (Madison). The wording of Sherman's
motion resembled (and probably was influenced by) the wording of the August 21 grand
committee proposal, but there were differences. In the August 21 proposal (which was not
adopted), the phrase "common defence and general welfare" was limited by grammar and context
to refer only to the recently concluded ordeal of revolution. In Sherman's formulation there was
no such restricting connection. In fact, Sherman's explicitly contemplated "expences that shall
be incurred" in the future. Also, the phrase "common defence and general welfare" in the August
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Similar language had been contained in the Committee of Detail's
supplemental report submitted August 22, but vote on the report was
postponed to enable each delegate to "furnish himself with a
copy."134  The report called for adding to the Taxing Clause the
phrase "for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the United
States ...."13
Rather than approve either of these formulations, however, the
delegates on September 4 adopted a third version, which blended these
two.' 36 The third version changed the Taxing Clause to read: "The
Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States."' 37 In this manner, the "general
welfare" phrase reappeared. It emerged in the course of addressing the
debts question, but here, unlike in the August 21 "grand committee"
proposal, the relationship between the "general welfare" phrase and
debt payment is one of conjunction, not apposition. This formulation
survives almost verbatim in the finished Constitution. 3 '
There is no contextual or grammatical reason for construing the
"general welfare" phrase in this clause as any less general or compre-
hensive in meaning than the same phrase in the utterly permissive
Spending Clause in the Articles of Confederation, 139 or in the Consti-
tution's improved preamble reported eight days later by the Committee
on Style and Arrangement. 40 Certainly nothing suggests such a
peculiarly narrow meaning of the phrase as was manifest in the
21 proposal was merely descriptive of the debts, or of the cause in which they had been incurred;
but in Sherman's, "to pay the debts" and to "provide for the common defence and general
welfare" were treated as distinct and separate applications of funds.
134. See supra text accompanying note 121.
135. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 366 (Journal). This was substantially
equivalent to the language originally proposed by Randolph during that Committee's earlier
deliberations, but was omitted from its principal, August 6 Report. See supra note 113.
136. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 495 (Journal), 499 (Madison). This blended
formulation apparently was adopted with no discussion at all. It had been proposed by yet
another "grand committee," appointed on August 31. See 2 id. at 473 (Journal), 481 (Madison).
The charge to this committee was to report on "such parts of the Constitution as have been
postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been acted on ... " 2 id. However, the
committee canvassed for other lacunae as well. Roger Sherman was a member of this "grand
committee," as he had been of the earlier one.
137. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 493 (Journal); see also 2 id. at 497 (Madison).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
139. The "general welfare" phrase in this September 4 provision contrasts markedly with
the same phrase used in the disapproved August 21 proposal. In the September 4 provision,
taxing to pay debts (including old debts from the Revolution) and taxing to provide for the
general welfare (and common defence) are referred to in separate, parallel phrases.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
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discarded August 21 "grand committee" proposal. Neither is there any
textual basis for cabining this "general welfare" phrase, as Madison
later would urge, within the scope of otherwise enumerated powers.
Power to spend for effectuating those enumerated powers was already
separately supplied by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
However, when proposed and approved, this merely allusive
subordinate phrase in the Taxing Clause was not even conceived as
granting any power at all! Had that been its purpose, grammatically
more appropriate models of power-granting language, which could have
been copied instead, were immediately at hand. 4' Moreover,
although the delegates surely understood that adequate power-granting
language was needed to authorize any spending not sustainable under
the Necessary and Proper Clause (such as the payment of prior debts),
Madison reports that Sherman's August 25 motion was disapproved by
every State but his own "as being unnecessary . "... 142 Had its
purpose been to grant that requisite power, Sherman's motion (and the
blended language later approved in its stead) could hardly have been
thought "unnecessary"!
Several other provisions had been added to the nearly finished
Constitution during the several days preceding September 4. As the
next Section explains, among them was a provision ample to authorize
federal spending whether or not to effectuate other enumerated powers.
Had he been concerned over power to pay debts, Sherman's August 25
motion would have been unnecessary and inapt because it contained no
power-granting language. Sherman's stated purpose, however, was
only "to connect with" the Taxing Clause some reference to "the
object of the old debts . . - 4"" as if to forestall arguable objections
against putting general revenues to such use. For this, the language of
mere allusion he proposed was quite appropriate. Moreover, his
provision could fairly be characterized as "unnecessary," even though
it also was uncontroversial and inconsequential enough to be accepted
without discussion in the modified form later suggested by the second
grand committee on September 4.144
141. For example, the August 21 "grand committee" report had proposed that the
legislature "shall have power to ... discharge" debts and to fulfill engagements. Even the
language of Gouverneur Morris' August 22 motion-"the Legislature shall fulfil the engagements
and discharge the debts"-was more apt as a grant of power.
142. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 414 (Madison) (emphasis added); see also 2
id. at 408 (Journal).
143. 2 id. at 414 (Madison).
144. 2 id. at 497 (Madison).
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The conclusion to which all this leads is that the "general
Welfare" phrase in the Taxing Clause of the Constitution alludes to the
vast generality of purposes to which tax revenues, as well as other
federal receipts, might be put, but does nothing to empower Congress
to spend. The power to spend, except pursuant to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, must depend upon other constitutional language.
Identifying that language is the task to which we now turn.
IV. THE "PROPERTY CLAUSE" BASIS FOR SPENDING
A. The Detail Committee's "Well Managing" Clause
As noted in the preceding Section, on August 18, 1787, Madison
and Pinckney submitted lists of additional powers for Congress, which
were referred to the Committee of Detail. 4 That Committee's
August 22 supplemental report contained, and the Convention
approved, provisions obviously responsive to several of these sugges-
tions. These include, for example, the clauses empowering Congress
to provide for patents and copyrights 4 ' and to grant letters of
marque and reprisal;147 the language authorizing Congress to regulate
Indian affairs even within the boundaries of States; 148 and the clause
empowering Congress to govern the national capital district not just
within the scope of otherwise enumerated powers, but "in all Cases
whatsoever."1 49
That August 22 supplemental report also contained, and the
Convention approved, provisions responsive to other Madison or
Pinckney suggestions, but much less obviously so. For example,
Pinckney had proposed that Congress be authorized "[tlo establish
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences," and
Madison had proposed that Congress be authorized "[t]o establish an
University.' 0  The Committee of Detail reported no language
obviously responsive to these proposals. Because the document three
weeks later still contained no language specifically responsive to them,
145. See supra text accompanying note 115.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 11.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 17.
150. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 325 (Madison); see also 2 id. at 321-22
(Journal). Establishing a university or seminaries would require expenditures of money, to be
sure; but it also could require much more, including land acquisition, planning and construction
of buildings, design of curriculum, operational management, and selection and employment of
staff.
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on September 14 Madison and Pinkney again moved that power "to
establish an University" be added. 5'
So far as surviving records show, no delegate opposed this
proposal on its merits either the first or the second time it was made.
On the second occasion, however, Gouverneur Morris pointed out that,
since the first, the delegates had authorized Congress to "exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" in the national capital
district. "[I]n all Cases whatsoever" meant that the competence of
Congress within that district would not be confined to the otherwise
enumerated powers; consequently, within the capital district, Congress
would be as competent as any state to establish and operate a
university. Apparently, most delegates were convinced by Morris'
assertion that "this will reach the object, '  and the motion explicitly
to authorize establishment of a university was voted down."5 3
This university example illustrates the technique of consolidating
several particular points under somewhat more general terms. There
are several other examples of this technique among Congress'
enumerated powers."'
151. 2 id. at 616 (Madison), 620 (McHenry).
152. 2 id. at 616 (Madison); see also 2 id. at 620 (McHenry).
153. 2 id. at 616 (Madison).
154. One other example is the suggestion attributed to Pinckney, 2 id. at 326 (Madison),
of power "[t]o regulate Stages on the post roads," 2 id. at 322 (Journal). The suggestion might
actually have been Gerry's. See 2 id. at 328 (Madison). This was never specifically addressed
by committee report or convention action; presumably it was thought subsumed by the Commerce
Clause, by the Postal Clause, or by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Another example is the much-controverted power to charter corporations. On August 18,
Madison had proposed power "[t]o grant charters of incorporation in cases where the Public good
may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent." 2 id. at 325
(Madison). Pinckney more simply had proposed power "to grant charters of incorporation." 2
id. at 325 (Madison). Two days later the Convention approved the Necessary and Proper Clause
which had been proposed by the Committee of Detail. 2 id. at 345 (Madison). The delegates'
recognition that this felicitous clause would authorize a multitude of possible means to the ends
it specified was evidenced by their rejection as superfluous of Madison's own floor suggestion that
authority specifically to create offices be added. 2 id. at 337 (Journal), 345 (Madison). Few
delegates could have anticipated so miserly a construction of this clause as Jefferson (and
Madison) would later propound. After all, before the decision to enumerate had been made, these
same delegates had repeatedly approved national legislative power in terms far less guarded than
these.
The "necessary and proper" language was perfectly apt for authorizing (among very many
other things) the creation of corporations as means to effectuate the other enumerated powers. The
August 18 proposals regarding incorporation had not been so restricted, however: Pinckney's was
carte blanche, and Madison's contemplated the chartering of corporations any time "the Public
good" might require "and the authority of a single State may be incompetent." 2 id. at 325
(Madison). Apparently most delegates considered it sufficient to give Congress power to
incorporate for effectuating other federal powers; it seems very unlikely that, when they approved
the Necessary and Proper Clause just two days after the utility of corporations had been
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Also on the Madison and Pinckney lists were proposals that
Congress be authorized to spend money for various purposes not
within any enumerated power. 5 One of these proposals, that
Congress have the power "to secure the payment of the public debt,"
has already been discussed.'56  In addition, Pinckney proposed
empowering Congress "[tjo establish... rewards .. .for the promo-
tion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures," and Madison
proposed empowering Congress "to encourage by premiums .. .the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries."'5 7 The apparent
premise of these suggestions was that financial inducement, by
sponsorship or reward, of activities or accomplishments beyond
Congress' competence to govern, might well promote the public good;
or, in other words, might "provide for the ... general welfare,"
although neither Madison nor Pinckney used that particular phrase.
The Committee of Detail did not report (nor did the Convention
approve) any language obviously responsive to these suggestions of
extraneous spending. However, one cannot therefore conclude that
commended, many of the delegates could have overlooked this obvious application of its terms.
This application was certainly obvious to the very first Congress (which included several erstwhile
Convention delegates), which enacted the bill to incorporate the Bank of the United States.
To reinforce his later thesis that power to incorporate was rejected by the Convention,
Madison would cite a discussion that occurred more than three weeks later, on September 14.
Dr. Franklin suggested amending the Postal Clause "to provide for cutting canals." 2 id. at 615
(Madison). Madison took this occasion to urge, once again, a power to create corporations
unrestricted to effectuating enumerated powers. 2 id. at 615 (Madison). He specifically ventured
that federal corporations could undertake various internal improvements. Madison's suggestion
was not even put to a vote and Franklin's was rejected.
Even from the scanty comments Madison reports in his notes, however, one cannot infer
doubts that the Necessary and Proper Clause would support chartering corporations to effectuate
enumerated powers (as distinguished, for example, from undertaking internal improvements). Some
comments were made in that September 14 discussion about incorporating a bank; but those
comments were responsive to the unlimited incorporating power Madison had proposed, not to the
possibility of incorporation in order to effectuate enumerated powers. No one at that time even
considered whether or how incorporating a bank might help deliver pay to scattered troops, supply
currency to facilitate tax payments, or ensure a source of credit for the government's operating
needs. When those questions were later considered, the sufficiency of the Necessary and Proper
Clause was plain.
The principle of enumerated powers does not demand any particular level of generality or
specificity. Greater specificity provides increased verbal and grammatical opportunities for
forensic reasoning and argument. However, covering several matters collectively with more
general terms of enumeration is sometimes the more practical expedient.
155. To this extent, in other words, Madison himself proposed language that would have
authorized at least some such extraneous spending that later would denounce as unconstitutional.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 115 et. seq.
157. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS supra note 35, at 321-22 (Journal), 325 (Madison).
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they were rejected. 5' The Convention records do not otherwise
evidence a practice of killing proposals in committee; and-as the
university example shows-they do demonstrate a practice of subsum-
ing several specifics under somewhat more general terms. It therefore
must be acknowledged as at least possible that the Committee of
Detail, rather than rejecting the proposals that Congress be authorized
to spend for debts, premiums, and rewards, actually subsumed these
specifics under language broad enough to cover them all.
In fact, the Detail Committee's supplemental report of August 22
contains language appropriate to do exactly that. The Committee
proposed authorizing the national legislature
to provide, as may become necessary, from time to time, for the well
managing and securing the common property and general interests
and welfare of the United States in such manner as shall not
interfere with the Governments of individual States in matters which
respect only their internal Police, or for which their individual
authorities may be competent.1 5 9
This provision, which for convenience of reference I call the Well
Managing Clause, answered several needs. Most obviously, the clause
was responsive to yet another item on Madison's August 18 list: Vast
expanses of land had been ceded to the nation by several of the original
States, to be governed under the Northwest Ordinance the Continental
Congress had enacted just five weeks before. 161 With reference to
this vast domain, Madison had included on his August 18 list a power
in the national legislature "[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of
the U. States," and "[tjo institute temporary Governments for New
States arising therein." '161
Certainly the "unappropriated lands" in that Northwest Territory
comprised part of the "common property . . of the United States"
contemplated by the Well Managing Clause. This could not have
been the whole of it, however.'62 The caveat regarding states'
158. Reflection on the lack of any language obviously responding to his suggestions might
possibly have reinforced Madison's later conviction that the Constitution does not countenance
extraneous spending.
159. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 367 (Journal).
160. See An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the Unites States Northwest
of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787, in 2 TIE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 957-
64 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1906).
161. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 324 (Madison).
162. Similarly, "disposal" is one option in dealing with property one owns, but "managing"
comprehends much more, and the Committee used the broader term.
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"internal Police" and matters "for which their individual authorities
may be competent" shows that the clause was designed also to deal
with something more: Because States were not deemed extraterritori-
ally competent, 63 this caveat could only have contemplated property
within States, and the Northwest Territory lay beyond every State's
borders.
This Well Managing Clause therefore seems also responsive to yet
another of Madison's suggestions, that Congress have power "to...
hold ... landed property" for military installations "and other
necessary buildings," 1'6 because most such facilities presumably
would be located within the boundaries of States. However, the Well
Managing Clause was equally apt to cover a great deal more: The
phrase "general interests and welfare" would have been mere surplus-
sage had it contemplated nothing more than the other phrase,
"common property."
The independent significance of the "general interests and
welfare" phrase is not at all difficult to discern. "General interests and
welfare" is simply a variation of "common interests" and "general
welfare," and the usage and import of the latter two phrases has been
elaborated in preceding Sections. Such contemporaneous usage by the
same people in the same Convention suggests that these phrases in this
context could not have been understood as limited in any significant
way.
Roger Sherman had used both phrases in his July 17 attempt to
articulate the scope of federal power before the principle of enumerated
powers had prevailed. 161 It was precisely because Sherman recog-
nized the phrases as, by themselves, all-encompassing that he had
added limiting terms equivalent to those contained in the "well
managing" clause's caveat. 166 Similarly, "General welfare" had also
been used in the Spending Clause of the Articles of Confederation,
163. The proposition that state competence is territorially limited was integral to
constitutional jurisprudence from the outset and was too fundamental to need any textual
predicate. After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, it came to be associated
with the Due Process Clause. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
164. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 321 (Journal), 325 (Madison).
165. See supra text accompanying note 80.
166. The caveat in Sherman's motion provided: "but not to interfere with the government
of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the government of such
States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned." 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 35, at 21 (Journal). The caveat in the Detail Committee's Well Managing
Clause provided: "in such manner as shall not interfere with the Governments of individual
States in matters which respect only their internal Police, or for which their individual authorities
may be competent." 2 id. at 367 (Journal).
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where the phrase's whole significance lay in the contrast it made
between the unrestricted spending discretion and the severely limited
governing power the Articles allowed to the central authority.'67
The Well Managing Clause certainly contemplated far more than
spending. The Well Managing Clause contemplated every kind of
action "to provide ... for the well managing and securing" of federal
property and the "general interests and welfare."' 68 While the clause
would have authorized more, it certainly would have authorized
spending as well. The phrase "general interests and welfare" was quite
apt to cover, among other things, the public interest in productivity
and economic improvement; "discoveries" and "agriculture, commerce,
trades and manufactures" were matters regarding which Madison and
Pinckney had suggested that Congress be empowered to pay "premi-
ums" or "rewards."' 6 9 The grant of power by that clause "to provide
... for the well-managing and securing the... general interests and
welfare" certainly would have authorized Congress to promote trade,
agriculture, industry, and invention by the application of largesse.
However, this Well Managing Clause never even got to the floor
for discussion. The clause was obviated by approval of a different
motion that covered essentially the same ground."70 Nevertheless,
the clause shows that the Committee of Detail took account of
Madison and Pinckney's suggestions that Congress be authorized to
spend for purposes extraneous to enumerated powers. While the
clause would have conferred power to manage unappropriated federal
lands and to manage military installations and other needful buildings,
the Well Managing Clause would also have authorized spending for
any publicly useful, though unenumerated, end.
Recognizing this feature of the Well Managing Clause is
important to an accurate understanding of the provision that was
adopted in its place.
B. Gouverneur Morris' "Property Clause"
The language that obviated the Well Managing Clause was moved
by Gouverneur Morris 7' and agreed to on August 30.172 Morris'
167. See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
168. Indeed, the Well Managing Clause would have vitiated the principle of enumerated
powers. No doubt that is why the clause copied Sherman's caveat as well, trying to forestall the
aggregation of power that the enumerated powers principle itself (were it not vitiated) would have
prevented.
169. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 325 (Madison).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 169 et seq.
171. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 458-59 (Journal), 466 (Madison).
[Vol. 18:215
The Basis of the Spending Power
motion provided that: "The Legislature shall have power to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the U. States ... "173 This provision
survives in the finished Constitution as the Property Clause of Article
IV.
174
What precipitated Morris' motion was a tangential issue that arose
during discussion of the formation and admission of new states. The
tangential issue concerned the competing claims of several states and
the United States to lands westward to the Mississippi from the
Appalachians or the Ohio River.
The issue of those claims was addressed by Daniel Carroll of
Maryland in a motion which Carroll himself withdrew after consider-
able discussion and replaced with another. 17 Morris promptly
moved to postpone Carroll's motion to take up his own substitute, and
the postponement was agreed to "nem. con." Morris' substitute then
was approved on its merits, with Maryland alone dissenting. 76
The second clause of Morris' August 30 motion did, indeed,
address the issue of those claims. 177  However, its first clause, set
forth above, demands some additional explanation because it was not
germane to anything else the delegates debated that day.
The matter on the floor when the western lands question arose
was Article XVII of the Detail Committee's August 6 Report. Article
XVII dealt with the admission of new states. Apparently Morris
believed the issue of western lands claims should be addressed instead
in the context of territory not yet at the threshold of statehood. The
Well Managing Clause in the Detail Committee's supplemental report
of August 22 would have provided appropriate context; but although
delegates by that time had copies of it in their hands, 17 that report
had not yet been brought to the floor.
Consequently, to dispose of the land claims issue without
cluttering the state admission provision Morris had to put forward
something equivalent to the Well Managing Clause and add a
172. 2 id. at 459 (Journal), 466 (Madison).
173. 2 id. at 458 (Journal), 466 (Madison).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2.
175. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35 at 458 (Journal), 465-66 (Madison).
176. 2 id. at 458-59 (Journal), 466 (Madison).
177. "[A]nd nothing in this Constitution contained shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims either of the United States or of any particular State." 2 id. at 458-59 (Journal), 466
(Madison).
178. As the Journal notes, consideration of the Report had been postponed on August 22
specifically "in order that the Members may furnish themselves with copies of the report." 2 id.
at 368 (Journal).
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"competing claims" provision, all in one motion. With the Detail
Committee's supplemental report in hand, each delegate could
immediately ascertain that the first clause of Morris' motion was
equivalent in import to that report's Well Managing Clause.
Consequently, that Morris' motion was approved without any reported
discussion of its first clause is not surprising, even though that clause
was not germane to anything then under discussion.
Because Morris' motion and the Well Managing Clause covered
substantially the same ground, Morris' motion mooted the Well
Managing Clause. Apparently for that reason, the Well Managing
Clause never did surface for Convention deliberation. A "grand
committee" appointed the next day was charged to report on "such
parts of the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of
reports as have not been acted on . . "179 The report of that
committee, of which Morris himself was a member,"'0 did identify
a number of provisions still awaiting action; and those propositions
occupied the delegates for the next several days. The Well Managing
Clause, however, was not one of those identified as still pending.
Apparently the clause was regarded as having been acted upon, even
though it never was brought to the floor except as transmuted into
Morris' August 30 motion.
Morris' skill with language is well known, and is demonstrated by
the concise language he chose on this occasion. Morris' motion
reached not only "territory" but "other property" as well. To be sure,
"other property" includes other real property; but that less inclusive
term Morris significantly eschewed. As assistant superintendent of
finance for the American Confederation, and prot~g6 of financier
Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris certainly understood that the
phrase "other property" comprehends personal property no less than
real, and understood that personal property includes money, as well as
financial assets of all kinds.
An unqualified power to "dispose of' federal money (in the words
of Morris' motion) provides ample authority for such "premiums" or
"rewards" as Madison and Pinckney had proposed. Indeed, it
authorizes any "disposal" (i.e., spending) that might promote, in the
words of the Well Managing Clause, the "general interests and welfare
of the United States" whether or not any particular expenditure might
179. 2 id. at 473 (Journal), 481 (Madison).
180. The delegates appointed to this committee were Gilman of New Hampshire, King of
Massachusetts, Sherman of Connecticut, Brearley of New Jersey, Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania, Dickinson of Delaware, Carroll of Maryland, Madison of Virginia, Williamson of
North Carolina, Butler of South Carolina, and Baldwin of Georgia. 2 id.
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also be authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause as "carrying
into Execution" another enumerated power.
On the other hand, unlike the Well Managing Clause, Morris'
language does not contemplate a generalized power "to provide ... for
... the . . . general interests and welfare of the United States."
Instead, Morris' language only authorizes the control and disposition
of federal property, including the tender of federal funds. In other
words, Morris' language does not disturb the allocation of governance
authority otherwise accomplished under the principle of enumerated
powers. Morris was therefore able to dispense with the wordy
caveat18' that had hedged the Detail Committee's Well Managing
Clause.
Five days after Morris 'Property Clause was approved, the
delegates, as earlier detailed, added the allusion in the Taxing Clause
observing that tax revenues might be used "to pay the Debts and
provide for the .. .general Welfare of the United States.""1 2 Making
that statement a mere allusion comported with the principle of
enumerated powers, because the requisite grant of power to spend
already had been separately provided by the approval of Morris'
motion five days earlier.
C. Confirming Gestures
Occasionally, of course, some participants at the Constitutional
Convention misunderstood what was being done (a fact that should
surprise no one experienced in group deliberations). Evidence of some
misunderstanding exists with regard to federal spending, but there is
stronger evidence that the import of the Property Clause for spending
was understood.
Max Farrand described Maryland delegate Dr. James McHenry
as "[a] man of only moderate ability." '183 McHenry made himself
memorable, however, by keeping some scanty notes. In his notes for
September 4, even though McHenry quoted the "general welfare"
phrase, he remarked:
"Upon looking over the constitution it does not appear that the
national legislature can erect light houses or clean out or preserve the
181. The Committee had proposed power to manage the general interests and welfare only
"in such manner as shall not interfere with the Governments of individual States in matters which
respect only their internal Police, or for which their individual authorities may be competent."
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
183. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
36 (1913) [hereinafter FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION].
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
navigation of harbours .... This to be further considered. A motion
to be made on the light house etc, to-morrow."' 1 4
No such motion was in fact made,18 5 and two days later McHen-
ry still thought the shortfall remained. In his notes for September 6 he
wrote: "Spoke to Gov Morris Fitzimmons and Mr Goram to insert a
power in the confederation enabling the legislature to erect piers for
protection of shipping in winter and to preserve the navigation of
harbors-Mr Gohram [sic] against. The other two gentlemen for it.
"186
McHenry's notes then declare: "Mr Gov: thinks it may be done
under the words of the I clause I sect 7 art. amended-and provide for
the common defence and general welfare."'8 7 From this proposition,
which he attributed to Gouverneur Morris, McHenry extrapolated ad
horrendum: "If this comprehends such a power, it goes to authorise the
legisl. to grant exclusive privileges to trading companies etc.
18
McHenry's wild reaction, however, suggests he might have
mistaken Morris' point. To grant exclusive trading privileges is vastly
different than simply to spend. The latter is merely a disposition of
ownership, while the former would be an assertion of prescriptive
power. Thus, McHenry seems to have understood Morris as
proffering the General Welfare Clause not merely as an allusion to
spending, but as a sweeping grant of governing competence to provide
for the general good.
McHenry's misunderstanding might have contributed to the myth
that Morris had tried to bestow generalized central governance
authority by trick. In a 1798 speech in the House of Representatives,
Albert Gallatin asserted, claiming nothing but hearsay in support, that
Morris, as a member of the Committee on Style and Arrangement, had
"attempted to throw [the General Welfare phrase] into a distinct
paragraph, so as to create ... a distinct power."'8 9  But, Gallatin
asserted, the trick was discovered by Roger Sherman, "and the words
184. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 504 (McHenry) (emphasis in original).
185. If he somehow knew of it in advance, McHenry might have been referring to what we
call the Enclave Clause, which refers to "needful buildings." The committee appointed on
August 31 had already drafted that provision, and would propose it the next day. See 2 id. at 505
(Journal), 509 (Madison). If so, however, this illustrates McHenry's imprecise bent of mind; that
clause only addresses jurisdiction, not acquisition or construction.
186. 2 id. at 529 (McHenry).
187. 2 id.
188. 2 id. at 529-30 (McHenry).
189. 3 id. at 379.
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restored as they now stand."'9 ° Some modern scholars have repeated
this charge with relish.' However, it seems quite unfounded.
Alterations in punctuation were made, but nothing to change the
import of the General Welfare Clause seems to have ever been
attempted.' 92 Madison, as well as Sherman, had served with Morris
190. 3 id.
191. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will be True: The Tenth Amendment and
the Spending Power, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 811 (1986); FORREST McDONALD, Novus
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 264-65 (1985).
McDonald embellishes the story by conjoining McHenry's account of his September 6th
conversation with Morris.
192. Gouvemeur Morris was one of the five persons appointed to the Style Committee, see
2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 547 (Journal), 553 (Madison), 554 (McHenry); and he
might well have served as its principal scrivener. See FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION supra note 183, at 181-82. But because the other members were Madison,
Hamilton, the very able Rufus King of Massachusetts, and Connecticut's highly respected
William Samuel Johnson, this was a group not easily duped by one member, no matter how clever
he might be.
When the "general welfare" provision was approved on September 4th, the punctuation
between "excises" and "to pay" was a comma. That provision was located in the first clause of
section 1 of Article VII of the Resolutions as they then stood. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS supra
note 35, at 493 (Journal). See also Farrand's convenient compilation of the approved provisions
at 2 id. at 565, 569 (Committee of Style). There were also commas after "taxes," "duties," and
"imposts." See 2 id. at 493 (journal). Farrand, presumably not as a "trick," omits the latter in
his compilation. See 2 id. at 569 (Committee of Style).
The draft Constitution reported from the Committee on September 12 was read aloud and
then ordered printed. 2 id. at 582 (journal); see also 2 id. at 585 (Madison). As printed, the
punctuation between "excises" and "to pay" was a semicolon, instead. 2 id. at 590, 594
(Committee of Style). However, whether this was due to direction from the Committee, or
Morris, one of its five members, or, instead, was due to accident or printer's error, no one actually
knows. No one ever objected to the semicolon displacing the comma. The comma following
"imposts" had been deleted too; but this deviation was too obviously inconsequential to ever have
been inflated by allegations of "trick."
As restyled and rearranged by the Committee, the clause in question no longer was the first
in its section. The Committee had placed the clause second, putting the provision for appointing
a treasurer by joint ballot before it. 2 id. at 590, 594 (Committee of Style); cf 2 id. at 565, 570
(Committee of Style). The treasurer provision was deleted, and the tax uniformity clause was
added on September 14. 2 id. at 614 (Madison); the skeletal account of the Journal for this day
is found at 2 id. at 611 (Journal). These changes necessitated resetting some type; and when the
instrument was next printed, the semicolon was a comma again. (The capitalization of some
words was also changed, but the omitted comma after "imposts" was not replaced.)
Whether behind these changes lay typographical error, an artless styling touch, or a sneaky
ploy of craft, cannot be known with certainty; but the last seems by far the least likely.
Correcting the punctuation would prove useful even if the possibility of misunderstanding were
inadvertent; and it seems rather unlikely that Sherman (and everyone else) would have remained
silent at the time had they suspected a trick.
Madison's account of the September 4th motion, by the way, omits all of the commas except
the one between "excises" and "to pay." Usage was rather irregular in those days, as Convention
records show, and we simply do not know to whom or how many of those voting on September
4 the exact choice and location of punctuation marks might have seemed material.
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on the "grand committee" which proposed adding the "general
welfare" phrase to the Taxing Clause;193 and Madison said of the
alteration to which Gallatin attributed such ominous import that it
"must have been an erratum of the pen or of the press . . . ."'9 It
seems scarcely conceivable that Morris could have pretended that this
clause, with or without punctuation changes, should support such a
proposition as McHenry's notes suggest.
More likely, Morris told McHenry simply that Congress could
spend money for lighthouses, for piers, and to dredge harbors, and
mentioned the "general welfare" language to confirm that the other
delegates contemplated very broad discretion in spending.' 95 In any
event McHenry, finding Morris' suggestion abhorrent, continued to
think that no clause yet approved would authorize the government to
even pay for lights and harbor improvements. Farrand appends to
McHenry's notes for September 15 "a loose scrap of paper," containing
three paragraphs, found among the McHenry manuscripts.' 96 One
paragraph consists of language apparently never moved, specifying
power for Congress "to erect piers buoys or marks and to deepen or
clean harbours for facilitating or improving navigation. "197 The other
two paragraphs are drafts of a motion McHenry made that day to
authorize states to lay tonnage duties to finance the same kinds of
improvements.19  Still thinking the federal government would be
powerless to fund such improvements, McHenry apparently wanted at
least to ensure that the states would be able to do so.
No one spoke in favor of dangerous shoals, unmarked channels,
or clogged harbors; surely everyone agreed such improvements as
McHenry envisioned would be good. Most delegates probably also
recognized, as McHenry plainly did not, that the provisions already
approved did amply authorize federal funding of such improvements,
and that it was pointless to encourage burdensome state tonnage duties
Gallatin's aspersion on Morris was dubious at best and deserves no further credit among fair-
minded scholars.
193. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 473 (Journal), 481 (Madison).
194. Memorandum of James Madison associated with his letter to Andrew Stevenson (Nov.
27, 1830), in 9 GAILLARD HUNT, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 413-14 n.2; reprinted
in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 491, 492.
195. He could also have pointed out that such spending would subserve the commerce
power; but that was a power about which McHenry and the other Maryland delegates had
particular apprehensions. See FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
183, at 152-53.
196. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 634 n.17 (McHenry).
197. 2 id. at 634 (McHenry).
198. See 2 id.
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to fund the same improvements. The delegates therefore struck from
McHenry's proposal all references to markers, lights, and harbor
improvements, and transformed his proposal from an authorization of
state tonnage duties to a prohibition of state tonnage duties without
congressional consent.' 99
Meanwhile, Benjamin Franklin had moved on September 14 to
add to the Postal Clause, "a power to provide for cutting canals where
deemed necessary."2 °00 This clause originally had authorized Con-
gress only to "establish post offices"; the phrase "and post roads" had
been added to it in mid-August.0 1 Franklin's motion reflected no
doubt that power merely to fund canals would otherwise have existed.
The power Franklin proposed was "to provide for cutting canals," and
"cutting" them comprehends acquiring the property rights, undertaking
the design, and accomplishing the construction. Arguably the power
to cut canals would also entail incidents of operation, maintenance, and
protection. James Wilson, who seconded Franklin's motion, noted
during the brief debate that such power might even entail the
production of revenue through tolls. The distinction between power
merely to pay for canals, and power "to provide for cutting canals" is
the same distinction President James Monroe would make thirty-five
years later between spending for internal improvements and undertaking
construction of the Cumberland Road." 2
Franklin's motion was defeated,0 3 and probably it would have
been even if Madison had not complicated matters by expanding the
motion to authorize the creation of corporations for any purpose
"where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative
provisions of individual States may be incompetent."2" Some
delegates were opposed because they thought canals, unlike post roads,
would be primarily of local benefit. 0 ' Probably more important,
199. 2 id. at 625-26 (Madison); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
200. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 615 (Madison).
201. See 2 id. at 303 (Journal), 308 (Madison).
202. James Madison, To the House of Representatives: Views of the President of the
United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822), in 2 JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 165 (1896) (paper accompanying
message vetoing the Cumberland Road Bill).
203. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 611 (Journal), 616 (Madison). The Journal
lists the motion as one "To grant letters of incorporation for Canals &ca." 2 id. at 611 (Journal).
Madison's more elaborate account suggests this was the form into which it was modified following
Madison's own intrusion of the corporations issue, Franklin's motion itself having said nothing
at all about incorporation.
204. 2 id. at 615 (Madison).
205. Sherman of Connecticut objected: "The expence in such cases will fall on the U[nited]
States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be cut." 2 id. at 615 (Madison).
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however, just as with respect to lighthouses and harbors, the delegates
must have understood the difference between undertaking ventures and
merely paying for them. Anyone cognizant of this distinction could
have opposed Franklin's motion for the same reason as McHenry's,
while simultaneously supporting federal funding of canals, channel
markers, and lighthouses, as well as premiums and awards to foster
agriculture, industry, and trade.20 6 Power to spend, even for extrane-
ous ends-the power alluded to by the "general welfare" phrase added
to the Taxing Clause-was already conferred by the property disposal
language proposed by Gouverneur Morris and approved.
Transmitting a copy of the proposed Constitution to their
Governor five days after it had been signed, Roger Sherman and his
fellow Connecticut delegate, Oliver Ellsworth, observed that "[t]he
objects, for which congress may apply monies, are the same mentioned
in the eighth article of the confederation, viz. for the common defence
and general welfare, and for the payment of the debts incurred for
those purposes. '207 This statement does not link the spending power
to any particular clause of the Constitution, but it does specifically
equate Congress' spending power to the unbounded spending
discretion the Confederation Congress enjoyed under Article VIII of
the Articles of Confederation-not to the modest governance powers
allowed the Confederation Congress under Article IX, or even to the
more substantial governance powers delegated by the Constitution.
Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation had authorized spending
with no more restrictions than Franklin's original, consolidative
confederation draft of 1775 had proposed-i.e., with no limitation on
legislative discretion at all.2 °8 Thus the power to spend under the
Constitution, Sherman and Ellsworth were telling their Governor, is
not cabined by the enumeration of governing powers.
D. Ownership Powers and Governance Powers
The Article IV Property Clause is most familiar, of course, in its
application to landed property, whether located within "territories,"
within federal enclaves, 209 or within states; but it has been recognized
206. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
207. Letter of Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept.
26, 1787), in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 35, at 99.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
209. Enclaves are geographic areas over which states have ceded governance jurisdiction to
the United States. In such places the Enclaves Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, as
distinguished from the Article IV Property Clause, empowers Congress to exercise legislative
jurisdiction "in all Cases whatsoever" (i.e., not limited to the scope of otherwise enumerated
[Vol. 18:215
The Basis of the Spending Power
as applying to personal property as well.21° Its application to federal
money and the disposal (e.g., spending) thereof has heretofore escaped
general notice only because Congress' spending power has been
misattributed to the allusive phrase in the Taxing Clause.
The power conferred by the Article IV Property Clause, however,
is not a governance power: It is simply an owner's prerogative to
manage and dispose. In territories outside the bounds of any state,
Congress does have comprehensive governance power-legilative
jurisdiction unrestricted by the principle of enumerated powers; but this
does not result from the Property Clause. Indeed, it does not result
from anything in the Constitution at all; it results from the principles
of international law, and the absence of any other sovereignty there.
Disposal of that governance power, moreover, is not affected by the
Property Clause. Governance power can be lost by defeat in war, or
disposed of by treaty made by the President and Senate. Action by the
Congress, such as the Property Clause contemplates, is neither
necessary nor sufficient for management or disposal of governance
power, but it is both necessary and sufficient for management or
disposal of federal property.
Whenever a nation acquires territory, by purchase, conquest, or
otherwise, quite apart from governance jurisdiction the Nation also
acquires ownership of the land, except to the extent that titles estab-
lished under prior regimes are recognized and preserved. Because so
few private titles had been previously established in the vast wilderness
acquired first by cessions from the original States and afterwards by the
Louisiana Purchase and the Guadelupe-Hidalgo and Gadsden Treaties,
the United States became the owner as well as sole government in those
territories. The management and disposal of this ownership interest in
the territories, as well as the management and disposal of ownership
interests in "other Property belonging to the United States" (emphasis
added), was what the Property Cause addressed.
Recognizing this distinction between ownership and governance,
one can reconcile untrammelled federal discretion in spending with the
powers). Any ownership interests of the United States within enclaves, however, are controlled by
the Article IV Property Clause. The difference is obvious: For example, the United States owns
only certain parcels within the District of Columbia (an enclave), but it has general legislative
jurisdiction over the whole.
210. Modem cases have held the Property Clause applicable, for example, to tangible
personalty such as audio tapes of White House conversations. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sampson, 389
F. Supp. 107, 137 n.80 (D.D.C. 1975). It seems equally applicable to intangible interests such
as federally-owned patent rights. See Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 364 F.
Supp. 423, 425 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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restricted central governing authority contemplated by the principle of
enumerated powers. The fact that contract obligations might ensue
from the acceptance of conditions that accompany federal largesse does
not mean that subsidy entails governance control.
V. CONCLUSION
If the spending power derives from the Property Clause, it should
be possible to inform spending power analysis by a study of the classic
cases about state and federal authority over federal lands;211 and the
212reciprocal also is true. There are numerous other practical ramifi-
cations as well. Elaborating them is beyond the reach of this Arti-
cle.213 The starting point for clear thinking about the spending
power, however, is finding its basis in Article IV, apart from the
Taxing Clause, distinguishing it from the "legislative Powers"
enumerated in Article I.
211. See generally David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976), reprinted in 14 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. 269 (1977). United
States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), for example, is as enlightening concerning Congress'
spending power as it is concerning Congress' power over non-monetary federal property.
212. In 1976, in what might be excused as dicta beyond the necessities of decision, the
Supreme Court overlooked the distinction between ownership and governance and spoke of the
Property Clause as if it were a grant of legislative jurisdiction. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976). The Kleppe error, which profoundly unsettled established constitutional
doctrine, is elaborately analyzed in David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal
Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 349-58 (1976), reprinted in 14 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
DIG. 269, 335-44 (1977). It is likely that if the issue is revisited with candor, and with the
assistance of counsel who grasp the principles involved, the Kleppe error will be corrected.
213. A beginning has been undertaken in David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1994).
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